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The Appraisal Similarity Effect: How Social Appraisals Influence 
Liking 
Jomel W. X. Ng, Eddie M. W. Tong, Sher Ling Kwek 
National University of Singapore 
 
Abstract 
The effects of cognitive appraisals on interpersonal relationships have hardly been studied. Three experiments 
examined how empathic social appraisal could influence liking. We tested for the appraisal similarity effect in 
which perceived similarity in appraisals boosts liking. In Experiment 1, perception of appraisal similarity led 
participants to express liking by disclosing personal contact information. This effect was replicated using a self-
report measure of liking in Experiments 2 and 3. Also, by independently manipulating attitude similarity, the 
appraisal similarity effect was deactivated under perceived attitude dissimilarity. Likewise, the robust attitude 
similarity effect was invalidated under perceived appraisal dissimilarity. In Experiment 3, the perception of 
validated personal beliefs mediated this interactive effect in a moderated mediation scenario, and the appraisal 
similarity effect.  
Keywords: appraisal, social appraisal, liking, similarity, attitude, validation 
  
 
Appraisal theories posit that we view the 
world in appraisal dimensions (Ellsworth & 
Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). For 
instance, we may appraise an event in terms 
of how pleasant it is (pleasantness), who 
causes it (agency), and how much control we 
have over it (control). This multi-
dimensional evaluation is posited to influence 
emotion. For instance, appraising events as 
within control inspires confidence, while 
perceiving events as unfair provokes anger. 
Research has provided strong evidence of 
appraisal-emotion relationships (e.g., 
Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, b; Neumann, 
2000; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985, 1987). However, appraisals affect more 
than just emotions. Since they facilitate 
adaptation (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009), they 
should also impact psychological processes 
widely. Indeed, appraisals have been found to 
influence numerous other outcomes such 
as inter-group conflicts (Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000), punishment allocation (Evers, 
Fischer, Rodriguez-Mosquera, & Manstead, 
2005), and persistence (Shah, 2003). 
However, the appraisals commonly 
examined in appraisal research are self-
oriented (Evers et al., 2005; Hareli & 
Parkinson, 2008; Manstead & Fischer, 
2001). Appraisal models generally focus on 
how events are perceived to impact the goals 
and needs of the self, rather than those of 
other people. Empirical research typically 
examines how the environment affects the 
self but not how it impacts others. Hence, 
little is known about the various kinds of 
social appraisals concerning, for instance, how 
the situation affects another person, how this 
person responds, how we compare against 
someone else, and whether social norms are 
violated (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). 
Appraisal theorists have also stated that 
appraisal studies have not covered all 
appraisals, including social appraisals (e.g., 
Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Reisenzein & 
Hofmann, 1993; Roseman, Antoniou, & 
Jose, 1996).  
According to Manstead and Fischer 
(2001), two social appraisals have been 
particularly neglected. The first concerns 
perceived interpersonal consequences of one’s 
behavior (Evers et al., 2005). For instance, if 
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we believe that venting our anger on others 
can cause them to stay away from us, we may 
not express our anger (Evers et al. 2005; 
Fischer & Evers, 2011). The second, which 
is the focus of the current research, refers to 
the appraisal of how other people are 
appraising an event, which we call empathic 
social appraisal (Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 
1999, 2001; Manstead & Fischer, 2001). For 
instance, besides our own appraisal that a 
suspect is responsible for a certain crime, we 
may try to know how another person is 
appraising the culpability of this suspect. 
Empathic social appraisal is thus an attempt 
to read the minds of others and infer their 
appraisals of the target object that we are also 
appraising. Such inference processes emerge 
early in life as early as three years (Borke, 
1971; Piaget, 1932), and are processed using 
a wide range of verbal and non-verbal cues 
(Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007; Scherer, Banse, 
& Wallbott, 2001). It holds adaptive societal 
significance to the extent that altruistic 
impulses are activated as a consequence of 
appraising that another person requires 
assistance (De Waal, 2008). 
Our aim is to examine one possible 
consequence of empathic social appraisal, 
focusing on interpersonal liking in the 
context of the similarity attraction effect. 
Liking reflects one’s global valence-based 
feelings towards a social target. Appraisal 
research on liking is sparse, but available 
evidence suggests that liking is associated 
with the appraisals of motive-congruency and 
high control (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 
1996). Also, people tend to like those whom 
they perceive as similar to them (e.g., Botwin, 
Buss, & Shackelford, 1997; Klohnen & Luo, 
2003). A well-researched phenomenon is the 
attitude similarity effect, in which a social 
target is liked more if he/ she holds similar 
attitudes towards an object as the self (Byrne 
& Clore, 1970; Byrne & Nelson, 1965). In 
this research, we examined whether liking is 
boosted upon knowing, through the process 
of empathic social appraisal, that the self and 
another share similar appraisals, and whether 
this effect is distinct from the attitude 
similarity effect. Also, we examined whether 
both effects are contingent on each other and 
tested a psychological mechanism underlying 
these effects. 
The Appraisal Similarity Effect 
The appraisal similarity effect states that 
interpersonal liking increases as a function of 
the perceived similarity between one’s 
appraisal of an object and one’s empathic 
social appraisal of how another is appraising 
the same object. As an illustration, imagine 
two individuals (subject and social target) are 
appraising whether a third party can control 
a challenging situation. Suppose also that it is 
unclear whether this third person has the 
ability to cope with the stressor, meaning that 
the subject and the social target can have 
similar or different appraisals of how much 
control this third person has over the 
situation. According to the appraisal 
similarity effect, if the subject appraises that 
the social target holds similar appraisals of 
the third person (i.e., perceived appraisal 
similarity) as he/ she does, he/ she will like 
the social target more than if the social target 
is appraised as appraising the third person 
differently (perceived appraisal dissimilarity). 
Three experiments were conducted to test the 
appraisal similarity effect. We also addressed 
the following issues.  
Appraisal similarity vs. attitude 
similarity. An important question is whether 
the appraisal similarity effect is similar to the 
attitude similarity effect. Both involve 
empathic inferences, but there are notable 
differences. Attitudes are global valence-
based assessments, summarizing one’s overall 
impression of an object, whereas appraisals 
are fine-grained analyses of the object on 
meaning-specific dimensions such as agency 
and morality. To our knowledge, there is no 
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empirical evidence to suggest that both are 
necessarily positively correlated, or that 
perception of attitude similarity (or 
dissimilarity) is associated with perception of 
appraisal similarity (dissimilarity). 
Conceptually, it is possible for appraisal 
similarity to be independent of attitude 
similarity. Using the same example, even if 
the subject and social target agree with each 
other that the third person is able to control 
the situation (appraisal similarity), they can 
still have diverging attitudinal judgments for 
this third person (one is impressed with the 
capability of third person, but the other is 
unmoved; attitude dissimilarity). The 
opposite can also happen: both have good 
impressions of the third person (attitude 
similarity), even though they appraise the 
third person in different ways (appraisal 
dissimilarity). In Experiment 2, we 
manipulated appraisal similarity and attitude 
similarity orthogonally, and checked for 
cross-manipulation influences; i.e., whether 
the manipulation of appraisal similarity 
affected perceived attitude similarity and 
whether the manipulation of attitude 
similarity affected perceived appraisal 
similarity.  
Interaction between appraisal similarity 
and attitude similarity. In Experiments 2 and 
3, we examined how appraisal similarity and 
attitude similarity interact to influence liking. 
The appraisal similarity effect was examined 
separately under conditions of attitude 
similarity and attitude dissimilarity. We 
expected to find a highly robust appraisal 
similarity effect when attitude was perceived 
as similar (i.e., higher liking in the similar 
appraisals/ similar attitude condition than in 
the dissimilar appraisals/ similar attitude 
condition). This is hardly surprising given the 
double doses of similarity in the similar 
appraisals/similar attitude condition.  
Of greater interest is what might be 
found in the attitude dissimilarity condition. 
The appraisal similarity effect might still exist 
in the attitude dissimilarity condition, 
suggesting that the perception of shared 
appraisals continued to enhance 
interpersonal liking relative to the perception 
of non-shared appraisals even when attitude 
was perceived as dissimilar. However, 
attitude is a person’s fundamental and overall 
judgment of the object. Perception of 
differing attitudes could signal to partners 
that there exist significant differences 
between them. Also, consistent with the 
negativity bias (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001), there is strong evidence 
that dissimilarity exerts disproportionally 
larger weights than similarity on liking 
(Singh & Ho, 2000; Singh & Teoh, 1999). 
The similarity-dissimilarity asymmetry 
implies that liking that would otherwise be 
enhanced by perceived appraisal similarity 
could be substantially attenuated by 
perception of differences in attitude. Hence, 
we predicted that the appraisal similarity 
effect should be weakened when attitudes are 
perceived as dissimilar. This will suggest that 
the appraisal similarity effect is contingent on 
attitude similarity; i.e. it can be deactivated 
when attitude is perceived as dissimilar. The 
similarity-dissimilarity asymmetry can also 
imply that under appraisal dissimilarity, the 
attitude similarity effect should be 
significantly reduced, indicating that the 
robust attitude similarity effect might also 
depend on perceived appraisal similarity.  
Mediating role of perceived validation. 
In Experiment 3, we examined whether 
perceived sense of validation could be driving 
the appraisal similarity effect, as well as the 
interactive effect between appraisal similarity 
and attitude similarity (if any) on liking. 
Knowing that others share similar beliefs as 
the self is reassuring and satisfying because it 
reinforces the legitimacy of personal beliefs 
(Clore & Gormly, 1974; Festinger, 1954; 
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Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Schachter, 
1959). These good feelings can be elicited in 
the company of similar others, enhancing 
liking towards them (Byrne, 1971; Byrne & 
Clore, 1970). On the other hand, liking for 
dissimilar others tends to be reduced because 
disparate views invalidate and threaten 
personal beliefs. This sense of validation has 
been found to explain the attitude similarity 
effect (Byrne & Clore, 1970), and we posited 
that it can also mediate the appraisal 
similarity effect. Hence, we predicted that 
perceived validation should mediate the 
relationship between appraisal similarity and 
interpersonal liking. Also, since perceived 
validation should mediate both the appraisal 
similarity effect and attitude similarity effect, 
we predicted a moderated mediation effect in 
which the interaction effect of appraisal 
similarity and attitude similarity on liking (if 
any) should be mediated by perceived 
validation.  
Overview of Studies 
We employed the classic phantom-other 
technique (Byrne & Nelson, 1965) in all 
experiments. Participants read a vignette and 
made their own appraisals of the protagonists 
on two appraisals relevant to the scenarios. In 
Experiment 1, the appraisals examined were 
agency and morality; in Experiments 2 and 3, 
they were agency and control. To manipulate 
appraisal similarity, participants were 
subsequently shown (fabricated) copies of the 
same appraisal measure allegedly completed 
by a fictitious participant (the social target). 
Similarity (dissimilarity) in appraisals was 
manipulated by making these bogus 
responses agree (disagree) with the 
participants’ own appraisal ratings. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, we also manipulated 
attitude similarity using the same technique. 
Thereafter, liking for the partner was 
measured, operationalized using different 
methods: behavioral indications in 
Experiment 1, and self-report in 
Experiments 2 and 3.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, appraisal similarity was 
first manipulated, after which participants 
were given the option of disclosing their 
contact information (email address and 
telephone number) to a bogus partner. We 
reason that people generally will not disclose 
contact information to a stranger unless they 
feel some liking towards the person. Hence, 
we hypothesized that participants in the 
similar appraisals condition would be more 
likely than those in the dissimilar appraisals 
condition to disclose their contact details. As 
a secondary objective, we also examined how 
the disclosures of email address and mobile 
number were differentially affected by 
appraisal similarity. Personal mobile numbers 
are generally regarded as more confidential 
than email addresses in the local population. 
While we predicted that perceived appraisal 
similarity would encourage disclosure of both 
contact information, participants should be 
more willing to disclose their email address 
than their mobile number. 
 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-six Singaporean 
undergraduates (74 females; Mage = 
20.13, SD = 1.60) participated for course 
credits. They were randomly assigned to one 
of two appraisal similarity conditions: similar 
appraisals (N = 49) and dissimilar appraisals 
(N = 49).  
 Procedure. Participants completed the 
study in private cubicles. They first read a 
passage (see Appendix) allegedly extracted 
from a journal entry written by an anonymous 
undergraduate. The vignette described a 
negative incident that was ambiguous in the 
sense that different agency and morality 
appraisals could be made of the two 
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protagonists. Next, participants rated their 
morality and agency appraisals of the 
protagonists (Raymond and Gary). We told 
them that we were interested in their 
“evaluation” of the protagonists. The labels 
“evaluation” and “evaluate” were used in our 
instructions because they should be more 
commonly used as compared to the more 
academic “appraisal” and “appraise”. We 
collected the appraisal measures after they 
were completed. The participants then 
completed an irrelevant filler task (simple 
mathematical problems) while we used their 
appraisal responses to manipulate appraisal 
similarity. 
We constructed fake ratings on a fresh 
copy of the appraisal measure in ways that 
gave the impression that it was completed by 
another person (e.g., handwritten index 
numbers, imperfect circling). A different 
fabricated copy was constructed for each 
participant, tailored according to his/ her 
experimental condition. For participants 
assigned to the similar appraisals condition, 
the fabricated responses were made on the 
same scale-point the participant made or one 
point away, and on the same side of the scale. 
For those in the dissimilar appraisals 
condition, the fabricated responses were 
made three or more scale-points from the 
participant’s responses, and on the opposite 
side of the scale. If a participant selected the 
mid-point, the fabricated response were 
made on either side of the scale (randomly 
determined across participants), and the 
number of scale-points away from the 
midpoint depended on the participant’s 
experimental condition. Although each 
appraisal was rated by two items, it did not 
matter whether both items were rated 
similarly or differently by the participant as 
the same procedure of manipulating appraisal 
similarity was applied.  
After the filler task, participants were 
informed that they were randomly paired 
with a same-gender participant from a 
previous session, who had read the same 
vignette and made the same evaluation 
ratings. This bogus participant was presented 
as “Participant X”. To prevent the word 
“partner” or actual names from eliciting 
unwanted connotations, we used a neutral 
“Participant X”. We explained that we were 
interested in how people form impressions of 
strangers based on limited information. 
Hence, the fabricated evaluation form 
allegedly completed by Participant X, as well 
as their own evaluation form, was given to the 
participants. They were told to look at X’s 
responses so as to get acquainted with 
him/her. They then rated the manipulation 
check items. 
Next, the participants were asked 
whether they would like to meet Participant 
X after the experiment. If they were 
interested, they could indicate their personal 
contact information which would be passed 
to Participant X. They were presented with a 
piece of paper, and were told that they could 
write down their email address or mobile 
number, or both, or leave the paper blank; 
every participant owned a mobile phone and 
had email address. The participants were 
then left alone for a short while. They also 
completed suspicion probe items and 
demographic items. Two participants were 
removed as they were close to guessing the 
hypothesis, leaving a final sample of 96.  
Measures. 
Appraisals. Morality was measured with 
items reflecting judgments of right vs. wrong 
and fairness vs. unfairness. Participants 
rated the protagonists on “To what extent 
was what happened to Gary (i.e. him being 
injured) fair or unfair to him?” and “To what 
extent was Raymond’s behavior towards Gary 
moral or immoral?”. Agency was measured by 
items reflecting blame, which were “To what 
extent was Gary to be blamed for his back 
injury?” and “To what extent was Raymond 
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to be blamed for Gary’s injury?”. All items 
were rated on nine-point scales that ranged 
from 1 to 9 and were similar to those used in 
past appraisal studies (e.g., Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Tong, 2010). Scales for the 
morality items ranged from very unfair/ very 
immoral to very fair/ very moral. Scales for the 
agency items ranged from not at all to very 
much. 
Perceived appraisal similarity. As 
manipulation checks, participants rated “To 
what extent do you and Participant X have 
similar/ different evaluation about Raymond 
and Gary?” on two nine-point scales that 
ranged from 1 (extremely different/ strong 
disagreement) to 9 (extremely similar/ strong 
agreement). As the words ‘evaluate’ and 
‘evaluation’ were repeatedly used to refer to 
the appraisal measure, it should be clear to 
the participants which measure we were 
referring to. All scores were averaged (α = 
.96). 
Results and Discussion 
     We first checked for outliers of 2.5SD 
from the mean; none was found. 
Manipulation check. A t-test showed 
that perceived appraisal similarity was higher 
in the similar appraisals condition (M = 
7.11, SD = 1.24) than in the dissimilar 
appraisals condition (M = 3.04, SD = 
1.34), t(94) = 15.44, p < .001, d = 3.19. 
Main analyses. Across both conditions, 
most participants (79.8%) disclosed their 
email address, but less than half (47.9%) 
disclosed their mobile number. Also, 34.0% 
of the participants disclosed only their email 
address, whereas 2.1% disclosed only their 
mobile number (45.7% disclosed both 
information). In sum, there is evidence that 
participants were generally more willing to 
disclose their email address than their mobile 
number. 
Two chi-square analyses were conducted, 
separately on email address and mobile 
number. Both analyses examined how the 
disclosure of contact information differed as 
a function of appraisal similarity. The 
analyses showed that participants in the 
similar appraisals condition (89.1% of the 
participants in this condition) were 
significantly more likely to disclose their 
email address to their partner than those in 
the dissimilar appraisals condition 
(70.8%), χ2(1) = 4.88, p = .03. Those in the 
similar appraisals condition (60.9%) were also 
more likely to disclose their mobile number 
than those in the dissimilar appraisals 
condition (35.4%), χ2(1) = 6.10, p = .01. Two 
McNemar tests were conducted, one for each 
appraisal similarity condition. Both analyses 
tested whether there was a significant 
difference between the disclosure of email 
address and the disclosure of mobile number. 
Participants in both the similar appraisals 
condition, p = .001, and the dissimilar 
appraisals condition, p < .001, were more 
likely to disclose their email address than 
their mobile number. 
As predicted, participants in the similar 
appraisals condition were more likely to 
disclose their email address and mobile 
number to their partner than those in the 
dissimilar appraisals condition. Also, 
participants in both conditions were more 
likely to disclose their email address than 
their mobile number, consistent with the 
claim that mobile numbers are regarded as 
more confidential than email addresses. 
More pertinent to our hypothesis, 
participants who felt a sense of appraisal 
similarity were significantly more likely 
(compared to those who felt a sense of 
appraisal dissimilarity) to disclose even their 
mobile number to their partner. This finding 
suggests that appraisal similarity could 
enhance liking towards a largely unknown 
person to the point that confidential 
information would be disclosed. Also, it does 
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not seem likely that participants disclosed 
their contact details just to please the 
experimenter or to comply with instructions, 
since few in the dissimilar appraisal condition 
disclosed their mobile number. On the 
contrary, the results suggest that their 
behaviors were determined by their appraisal 
similarity condition. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
One objective of Experiment 2 was to 
replicate the findings in Experiment 1 using 
a validated measure of liking. While 
behavioral measures have strong appeals, 
including greater immunity from cognitive 
and response biases known to plague verbal 
measures (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, 
Schwarz, & Stone, 2004), their construct 
validity is of question. Disclosure of contact 
information might reflect, for instance, trust, 
risk taking, or impulsiveness, instead of 
liking. Hence, we used a widely used and 
highly validated measure of liking: the 
Interpersonal Judgment Scale (IJS; Byrne, 
1971). We predicted higher IJS scores in the 
similar appraisals condition than in the 
dissimilar appraisals condition. 
In addition, attitude similarity was 
orthogonally manipulated and cross-
manipulation checks were conducted to 
assess the distinctiveness of appraisal 
similarity from attitude similarity. 
Specifically, we examined whether the 
manipulation of appraisal similarity would 
affect perceived attitude similarity, and 
whether the manipulation of attitude 
similarity would affect perceived appraisal 
similarity. We also examined whether the 
perception of appraisal similarity was 
correlated with the perception of attitude 
similarity. We further examined the 
interactive effect (if any) between appraisal 
similarity and attitude similarity on liking.  
Experiment 2 also differed from 
Experiment 1 in other (minor) ways to assess 
the robustness of the findings. First, we 
examined control, a different appraisal, 
together with agency, to determine whether 
our findings could be generalized to other 
appraisals. Second, to ascertain that the 
results in Experiment 1 were not artifacts of 
the materials used, we used a different set of 
vignette materials with the changes being 
that different appraisal items were used, and 
only one protagonist was evaluated. 
 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty-
three female Singaporean undergraduates 
participated for course credit.1 They were 
randomly assigned to the following 
conditions: similar appraisals/ similar attitude 
(n = 30), similar appraisals/ dissimilar attitude 
(n = 31), similar appraisals/ dissimilar attitude 
(n = 31), and dissimilar appraisals/ similar 
attitude (n = 31). 
 Procedure. Similar to Experiment 1, 
participants first read a passage (Appendix) 
allegedly written by an undergraduate. The 
passage featured one protagonist (i.e. 
Raymond) and was ambiguous in terms of 
how the protagonist could be appraised on 
agency and control. Participants then rated 
Raymond on two forms (the sequence of 
which was counterbalanced). One form was 
titled “Evaluation Form” (following 
Experiment 1), which contained the appraisal 
items; the other form was titled “Impression 
Form”, which contained the attitude items. 
The participants then worked on a filler task 
while we constructed fake scores on new 
Evaluation and Impression forms to 
manipulate appraisal similarity and attitude 
similarity, respectively, using the same 
procedure from Experiment 1. Participants 
were then paired with a bogus same-gender 
“Participant X” using the same cover story. 
They were given fabricated Evaluation and 
Impression forms allegedly from X, along 
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with their own. After looking at X’s scores, 
they completed manipulation check items, 
the IJS, and suspicion probe items. One 
participant was removed as she was close to 
guessing the hypothesis, leaving the final 
sample at 122 participants.  
Measures. 
Appraisals. The Evaluation Form 
contained two agency items (“To what extent 
do you think Raymond was responsible for 
the fact that all attendees were not seated on 
time?” and “To what extent do you think that 
Raymond was accountable for the fact that all 
attendees were not seated on time?”) and two 
control items (“To what extent do you think 
that Raymond could have better control over 
the planning of this talk such that all 
attendees would be seated on time?” and “To 
what extent do you think that Raymond 
could have exerted more influence over the 
planning of this talk such that all attendees 
would be seated on time?”). They were rated 
on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 9 (very much). 
Attitudes. The Impression Form 
contained two items (“To what extent do you 
agree/ disagree with Raymond on this plan?” 
and “To what extent are you in support/ not 
in support of Raymond on this plan?”). Both 
items were rated on nine-point scales that 
ranged from 1 (extremely disagree/ extremely 
not in support) to 9 (extremely agree/ extremely 
in support). We modeled these items after 
those used in attitude research that asked 
respondents how much in favor they were of 
an attitude object, which in this case was 
Raymond with reference to his plan. 
Perceived appraisal similarity. For 
manipulation checks, participants were asked 
to refer to their own and Participant X’s 
Evaluation Forms and rated “To what extent 
do you think that you and Participant X have 
similar/ different evaluations of Raymond?” 
on two nine-point scales that ranged from 
1 (extremely different/ strong disagreement) to 
9 (extremely similar/ strong agreement). The 
scores were averaged (α = .95). 
Perceived attitude similarity. For 
manipulation checks, participants were asked 
to refer to their own and Participant X’s 
Impression Forms and rated “To what extent 
do you think that you and Participant X have 
similar/ different impressions of Raymond?” 
on two nine-point scales that ranged from 
1 (extremely different/ strong disagreement) to 
9 (extremely similar/ strong agreement). The 
scores were averaged (α = .97). 
Liking. The ten-item IJS was adapted for 
this study (e.g., “I find Participant X 
likeable”) and was rated on nine-point scales 
that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 
(strongly agree). All scores were averaged with 
opposite items reversed (α = .87). 
Results and Discussion 
  2.4% of the data that were 2.5SD from 
the mean were excluded. 
Manipulation checks. Participants in the 
similar appraisals condition (M = 7.03, SD = 
0.91) were more likely to rate Participant X’s 
appraisals as similar to theirs than those in 
the dissimilar appraisals condition (M = 
2.76, SD = 0.78), t(118) = 27.46, p < .001, d = 
5.06. In contrast, participants in the similar 
attitude condition (M = 4.94, SD = 2.30) did 
not differ from those in the dissimilar 
attitude condition (M = 4.84, SD = 2.33) in 
terms of perceived appraisal similarity, t(118) 
= 0.23, p = .82, d = 0.04. Perceived attitude 
similarity (M = 7.42, SD = 1.00) was higher 
in the similar attitude condition than in the 
dissimilar attitude condition (M = 3.10, SD = 
1.07), t(120) = 23.05, p < .001, d = 4.21. In 
contrast, the similar appraisals condition 
(M = 5.27, SD = 2.35) and the dissimilar 
appraisals condition (M = 5.17, SD = 2.47) 
did not differ in perceived attitude 
similarity, t(120) = 0.23, p = .82, d = 0.02. 
These results indicate that our manipulations 
were effective in inducing only the intended 
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constructs. Manipulation of appraisal 
similarity affected only perceived appraisal 
similarity and not perceived attitude 
similarity, whereas manipulation of attitude 
similarity affected only perceived attitude 
similarity and not perceived appraisal 
similarity. Also, perceived appraisal similarity 
and perceived attitude similarity did not 
correlate with each other, r(121) = .04, p = 
.68. This supports the notion that 
participants could perceive similar appraisals 
but different attitudinal judgment 
concurrently held by their partner, or that the 
partner disagreed on appraisals but agreed on 
attitudinal judgment. 
Main analyses. A 2 (appraisal similarity) 
× 2 (attitude similarity) ANOVA performed 
on the IJS scores revealed a significant main 
effect of appraisal similarity, F(1, 116) = 
7.73, p < .01, η2 = 0.06. The similar appraisals 
condition (M = 56.17, SD = 8.51) generated 
stronger liking towards X than the dissimilar 
appraisals condition (M = 52.00, SD = 8.45). 
A marginally significant effect of attitude 
similarity was also present, F(1, 116) = 
3.55, p = .06, η2 = 0.03. Participants in the 
similar attitude condition (M = 55.56, SD = 
9.81) indicated liking X more than those in 
the dissimilar attitude condition (M = 
52.66, SD = 7.26). 
There was a significant interaction 
effect, F(1, 116) = 5.63, p = .02, η2 = 0.05. 
Simple effect analyses showed that the 
similar attitude condition produced greater 
liking towards X than the dissimilar attitude 
condition under the similar appraisals 
condition, t(57) = 3.28, p < .01, d = 0.87), but 
not under the dissimilar appraisals 
condition, t(58) = -0.33, p = .74, d = 0.09. 
Therefore, the robust attitude-similarity 
effect was replicated only under appraisal 
similarity. Also, participants in the similar 
appraisals condition reported higher levels of 
liking towards X than those in the dissimilar 
appraisals condition under the similar 
attitude condition, t(57) = 3.28, p < .01, d = 
0.87, but not under the dissimilar attitude 
condition, t(59) = 0.33, p = .74, d = 0.09. 
Hence, the appraisal similarity effect 
occurred only when attitudes were perceived 
as similar (see Figure 1).  
Overall, these results indicate that 
attitude similarity did not enhance liking 
when coupled with appraisal dissimilarity. 
Likewise, appraisal similarity did not 
enhance liking when coupled with attitude 
dissimilarity. In addition, the significant 
main effect of appraisal similarity provides 
stronger support for the appraisal similarity 
effect.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 Experiment 3 was intended for several 
objectives. First, it aimed to examine whether 
the appraisal similarity × attitude similarity 
interactive effect obtained in Experiment 2 
could be replicated. Second, we examined 
whether perceived validation mediated the 
appraisal similarity effect and the interactive 
effect on interpersonal liking. Third, the 
manipulation check items in Experiment 2 
could have alerted participants to possible 
similarities/ differences between them and 
their phantom partners.2 In Experiment 3, 
these items were dropped. Finally, in 
Experiment 2, the attitude items might be 
targeted at a behavior of the protagonist, 
whereas the appraisal items were targeted at 
the protagonist. In Experiment 3, both 
variables were standardized by having them 
targeted at the protagonist.  
 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and twenty-
one Singaporean undergraduates (60 females; 
Mage = 21.91, SDage = 2.17) participated for 
monetary reimbursement. They were 
randomly assigned to the similar appraisals/ 
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similar attitude (n = 30), similar appraisals/ 
dissimilar attitude (n = 29), similar appraisals/ 
dissimilar attitude (n = 31), or dissimilar 
appraisals/ similar attitude condition (n = 31). 
In a preliminary analysis, the moderating 
effect of gender was tested in a 2 (appraisal 
similarity) × 2 (attitude similarity) × 2 
(gender) ANOVA. Gender did not moderate 
the effect of appraisal similarity, effect of 
attitude similarity, and the interaction effect 
(all ps > .10). Gender was thus dropped from 
subsequent analyses.    
 Procedure. The procedure was largely 
identical to Experiment 2 except for the 
following changes. Participants answered 
attitude items that were worded to reflect 
attitude towards the protagonist. After 
looking at X’s (fabricated) forms, they rated 
several measures that included the IJS and the 
perceived validation measure; sequence of the 
questionnaires was counterbalanced. Finally, 
no manipulation check item was 
administered.  
Measures. 
Appraisals. The same Evaluation Form 
from Experiment 2 was used. 
Attitudes. Participants rated “To what 
extent do you like/ dislike Raymond?”, “To 
what extent is your impression of Raymond 
favorable/ unfavorable?”, “To what extent 
would you like/ dislike meeting Raymond?”, 
and “To what extent is your attitude towards 
Raymond positive/ negative?” on nine-point 
scales that ranged from 1 (extremely dislike/ 
extremely unfavorable/ extremely dislike/ 
extremely negative) to 9 (extremely like/ 
extremely favorable/ extremely like/ extremely 
positive).  
Perceived validation. Participants rated 
“To what extent does X make you feel 
validated?”, “To what extent does X make you 
feel affirmed?”, and “To what extent does X 
make you feel rejected?” (reverse-coded) on 
seven-point scales that ranged from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (extremely). Including the rejected 
item produced a low Cronbach’s alpha (.50) 
hence it was dropped. The affirmed and 
validated items were averaged (α = .90).  
Liking. Participants completed the same 
IJS scale (α = .85). 
Results and Discussion 
 We first checked for outliers of 2.5SD 
from the mean; none was found.  
Main analyses. A 2 (appraisal similarity) 
× 2 (attitude similarity) ANOVA performed 
on the IJS scores revealed a significant main 
effect of appraisal similarity, F(1, 117) = 
4.23, p = .04, η2 = .04. The similar appraisals 
condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.26) generated 
stronger liking towards Participant X than 
the dissimilar appraisals condition (M = 
4.64, SD = 1.02). A significant main effect of 
attitude similarity was also found, F(1, 117) 
= 15.65, p < .001, η2 = 0.11. Participants in 
the similar attitude condition (M = 
5.20, SD = 1.02) liked Participant X more 
than those in the dissimilar attitude condition 
(M = 4.46, SD = 1.17). 
More importantly, there was a significant 
interaction effect, F(1, 117) = 8.89, p < 
.01, η2= 0.07. Simple effect analyses showed 
that participants in the similar appraisals 
condition reported higher levels of liking 
towards X than those in the dissimilar 
appraisals condition under the similar 
attitude condition, t(58.93) = 4.01, p < 
.001, d = 1.04, but not under the dissimilar 
attitude condition, t(58) = -0.49, p = .62, d = 
0.13. Also, the similar attitude condition 
produced greater reported liking towards X 
than the dissimilar attitude condition under 
the similar appraisals condition, t(57) = 
4.61, p < .001, d = 1.22, but not under the 
dissimilar appraisals condition, t(60) = 
0.82, p= .41, d = 0.21. Therefore the results 
from Experiment 2 were replicated (Figure 
2).  
Mediation analyses. To examine whether 
the effect of appraisal similarity on 
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interpersonal liking was mediated by 
perceived validation, we employed non-
parametric bootstrapping conducted on 5000 
random samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). 
Appraisal similarity (similar appraisals = 1, 
dissimilar appraisals = -1) was entered as the 
predictor variable, liking as the outcome 
variable, and perceived validation as the 
mediating variable. The results revealed that 
the 95% bias corrected and accelerated 
confidence intervals (CI) for the indirect 
effect did not include zero (95% CI = 0.04; 
0.21), which is evidence that perceived 
validation significantly mediated the effect of 
appraisal similarity on liking. As shown in 
Figure 3, the mediating effect of perceived 
validation was full given that the direct effect 
of appraisal similarity on liking was reduced 
to non-significance after including it.  
To test whether the interaction effect of 
appraisal similarity and attitude similarity 
was mediated by perceived validation, we 
employed a moderated mediation analysis. 
According to Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt 
(2005), three regression models should be 
tested: 
DV = b10 + bIVIV + bModMod + 
bIV*ModIV*Mod + e  (Model 1) 
Med = b20 + bIVIV + bModMod + 
bIV*ModIV*Mod + e  (Model 2) 
DV = b30 + bIVIV + bModMod + 
bIV*ModIV*Mod + bMedMed + 
bMed*ModMed*Mod + e (Model 3) 
Where IV, DV, Mod, and Med refer to 
the independent variable (appraisal similarity; 
similar appraisals = 1, dissimilar appraisals = 
-1), dependent variable (liking), moderator 
(attitude similarity; similar attitude = 1, 
dissimilar attitude = -1), and mediator 
(perceived validation), respectively, and * 
denotes interaction between specific 
variables. Mediated moderation would be 
established if the following criteria are met 
(Muller et al., 2005). First, bIV*Mod in Model 1 
is significant. Second, bIV*Mod in Model 2 is 
significant. Finally, in Model 3, bMed is 
significant; a significant bIV*Mod would 
indicate partial mediation whereas a non-
significant bIV*Mod would indicate full 
mediation. The results are shown in Table 1.  
The above analyses demonstrated that the 
interaction effect between appraisal similarity 
and attitude similarity was significant. This 
satisfied Condition 1. When Model 2 was 
tested, there was a significant interaction 
effect between appraisal similarity and 
attitude similarity on perceived validation, 
satisfying Condition 2. When Model 3 was 
tested, perceived validation positively 
predicted liking, satisfying Condition 3. The 
interaction effect between appraisal similarity 
and attitude similarity on liking remained 
significant, indicating partial mediation 
effect of perceived validation.  
 
General Discussion 
  The primary aim of this research was to 
provide an initial demonstration of how 
empathic social appraisal can influence 
interpersonal liking. We proposed and found 
evidence for the appraisal similarity effect in 
which perceived similarity in appraisal 
enhances liking. We strengthened evidence 
of this effect by operationalizing liking using 
both verbal and behavioral measurements. 
Further, we demonstrated that this effect is 
independent of the attitude similarity effect. 
We also found that under perceived 
dissimilarity in attitude, the appraisal 
similarity effect is weakened, and under 
perceived dissimilarity in appraisals, the 
robust attitude similarity effect is also 
weakened. Finally, we showed that perceived 
validation fully mediates the appraisal 
similarity effect, and partially mediates the 
interaction effect between both forms of 
perceived similarity on interpersonal liking.  
       In Experiment 1, we obtained the 
first evidence that similarity in appraisals can 
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boost interpersonal liking. Participants were 
more likely to disclose personal contact 
information to a bogus partner whom they 
perceived to hold similar appraisals as them, 
as compared to a partner whom they 
perceived to hold dissimilar appraisals. This 
finding was conceptually replicated in 
Experiments 2 and 3 using an established 
self-report measure of liking. Participants in 
the similar appraisal condition reported 
higher levels of liking towards the bogus 
partner than those in the dissimilar appraisal 
condition. 
The use of behavioral and self-report data 
serves complementary purposes. Self-report 
methods are susceptible to various cognitive 
biases (Kahneman et al., 2004), whereas 
behavioral indicators present validity 
concerns. Consistent results from both 
measures could help to ascertain the veracity 
of the appraisal similarity effect. This multi-
method approach also demonstrates the 
various facets of liking. Liking can be 
conveyed not only verbally, but also through 
physical actions. In Experiments 2 and 3, 
participants reported their levels of liking on 
questionnaire items, while those in 
Experiment 1 expressed their liking by 
sharing their contact details. Further, the use 
of two behavioral indicators reveals nuances 
of liking that would have been missed if only 
one indicator was used. While the similar 
appraisals participants were more inclined 
than the dissimilar appraisals participants to 
disclose both contact information, they (like 
their dissimilar appraisals counterparts) were 
less willing to disclose their mobile number 
than their email address. This finding also 
suggests that the appraisal similarity effect 
does not increase liking towards a stranger so 
much that any information will be 
unreservedly disclosed. 
We also demonstrated that the appraisal 
similarity effect is distinct from the attitude 
similarity effect. Cross-manipulation check 
analyses in Experiment 2 revealed that the 
manipulation of appraisal similarity did not 
affect perceived attitude similarity, and 
neither did the manipulation of attitude 
similarity influence perceived appraisal 
similarity. Hence, empathically appraising a 
social target as having similar appraisals does 
not necessarily lead to perceiving the target as 
sharing similar attitudes, and perceiving the 
target as having similar attitudes does not 
necessarily result in appraising the target as 
sharing similar appraisals. The results also 
underscore the conceptual differences 
between attitudes and appraisals, the former 
being global valence-based evaluations and 
the latter being more focused meaning-
specific analyses. The fact that our 
participants demonstrated independent 
responses between the appraisal and attitude 
items also suggests that lay persons can 
identify them as distinct forms of judgments. 
 In Experiments 2 and 3, the appraisal 
similarity effect and the attitude similarity 
effect were found to be contingent upon each 
other. The appraisal similarity effect was 
deactivated under attitude dissimilarity; 
likewise, the attitude similarity effect was 
deactivated under appraisal dissimilarity. 
Because attitude summarizes one’s 
fundamental judgment of an object (Ajzen, 
2001; Crano & Prislin, 2006; Krosnick & 
Petty, 1995), it is conceivable that 
relationships based on a convergence of 
attitude between partners can withstand 
perceived differences in other domains, 
including appraisals. However, this was not 
the case in our studies; perceived similarity in 
attitude no longer enhanced liking over 
perceived dissimilarity in attitude when the 
partner disagreed on appraisals. The findings 
may imply that appraisals can shape 
relationship strength in significant ways. 
When partners find that they see eye-to-eye 
on appraisals, it signals a strong alignment of 
views between them, which can potentially 
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enhance their relationship. However, if they 
disagree with each other on appraisals, it 
signals critical differences between them that 
can damage their relationship even if they 
agree on attitudinal judgment. According to 
our findings, and consistent with the 
similarity-dissimilarity asymmetry (Singh & 
Ho, 2000; Singh & Teoh, 1999), perception 
of differences in appraisals is strong enough 
to outweigh any advantage that perception of 
similarity in attitude has on enhancing liking.  
 A similar argument can be posited to 
explain why similar appraisals did not 
enhance liking relative to dissimilar 
appraisals when there was perceived 
dissimilarity in attitude. Perceived attitudinal 
differences signal significant interpersonal 
differences that undermine interpersonal 
liking. Even if a partner is perceived as 
appraising an object in similar ways, the fact 
that he/ she holds a dissimilar attitude is 
sufficient to hint at fundamental differences 
existing in the relationship. Therefore, 
perceived differences in attitudes can also 
negate the beneficial interpersonal effects of 
perceived appraisal similarity. 
 The perceived validation of personal 
beliefs was found to mediate the appraisal 
similarity effect. Positive reinforcement 
models indicate that attitude similarity 
enhances liking because the similar partner is 
perceived as affirming one’s beliefs through 
his/ her similar attitudinal judgments (Byrne 
& Clore, 1970). Supporting these positive 
reinforcement perspectives, the current 
findings show that the reason why perception 
of appraisal similarity enhances liking is 
because it also affirms one’s beliefs. This 
provides evidence that the validation effect 
also applies to appraisals. Given that both 
appraisal similarity and attitude similarity 
boost one’s sense of personal validation, the 
conjecture could be made that the interaction 
effect between these two forms of similarity 
on interpersonal liking should also be 
mediated by perceived validation. 
Experiment 3 supports this conjecture. 
Another implication of these findings is that 
the similarity-dissimilarity asymmetry can 
also affect perceived legitimacy of personal 
worldviews. The negative impact of 
dissimilarity in eliciting doubts in individuals 
about their beliefs is stronger than the 
positive impact of similarity in assuring 
individuals of their beliefs. To our 
knowledge, this research is the first to show 
this effect to apply not just to interpersonal 
judgments, but also intrapersonal 
evaluations.  
Our results should be interpreted with 
the limitations in mind. The current studies 
examined only a selected set of appraisals, and 
future research could examine whether 
manipulation of similarity in other appraisals 
(e.g., certainty) would result in similar effects 
on interpersonal liking. Also, the moderating 
role of appraisals on the relationship between 
appraisal similarity and attitude similarity 
itself could be examined. Specifically, it 
seems possible that appraisals with valence 
connotations (e.g., morality) are more likely 
to result in appraisal similarity correlating 
with attitude similarity than appraisals 
without or with weaker valence connotations 
(e.g., agency). For instance, if two individuals 
appraise a target as low (vs high) in morality 
(the extent to which the target’s behavior was 
morally right), they might share similar 
negative (positive) attitudes towards the 
target. However, if these two individuals 
agree in appraising the target as high in 
agency-self (who is responsible for causing an 
event), they might not share similar attitude 
towards the target because the desirability of 
the outcome of the agency-self appraisal also 
depends on other appraisals (e.g., whether 
the event was wanted or unwanted). Another 
avenue for future research could be to provide 
participants their partner’s personal contact 
information and examine whether they 
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would indeed initiate contact with that 
partner after the experiment (Reis, Maniaci, 
Caprariello, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2011). 
Finally, since emotions are known to be 
evoked by appraisals, it could be of interest to 
examine whether emotional similarity could 
mediate the liking effects found in our 
research. As stated, appraisal theories posit 
that emotions are associated with a specific 
pattern of appraisals. Hence, individuals 
sharing the same appraisals of the target are 
likely to also share the same associated 
emotions of the target. This similarity in 
emotions might mediate effects on liking. In 
addition, attraction research could also 
examine emotion outcomes other than the 
traditional liking variable. Individuals do not 
just like each other, they may also feel hopeful 
for each other, joy for each other, or angry at 
each other, depending on the appraisals they 
make. Appraisal theories offer a platform for 
predicting and understanding the diverse 
emotional responses relationship partners 
could feel towards one another.  
In conclusion, while social appraisals have 
been examined for their effects on emotions, 
the roles they play in interpersonal liking are 
less understood. The current studies provide 
some initial data on this issue but further 
research is needed to delve deeper into how 
social appraisals may interact with other 
variables in interpersonal processes. 
 
Footnotes 
1 Due to an error, age was not recorded. Like Study 1, the sample 
in this study comprised undergraduates completing the same 
introductory psychology classes. We expect no difference in age 
between the current participants and those in Study 1.  
2 We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.  
 
References 
Ajzen, I. (2001). Nature and operation of attitudes. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 52, 27-58. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.27 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, 
K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. Review of 
General Psychology, 5, 323-370. doi:10.1037/1089-
2680.5.4.323 
Borke, H. (1971). Interpersonal perception of young 
children: Egocentrism or empathy?. Developmental 
Psychology, 5, 263-269. doi:10.1037/h0031267 
Botwin, M. D., Buss, D. M., & Shackelford, T. K. (1997). 
Personality and mate preferences: Five factors in mate 
selection and marital satisfaction. Journal of Personality, 
65, 107-136. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1997.tb00531.x 
Byrne, D. (1971). The attraction paradigm. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Byrne, D., & Clore, G. L. (1970). A reinforcement model 
of evaluative responses. Personality: An International 
Journal, 1, 103-128. 
Byrne, D., & Nelson, D. (1965). Attraction as a linear 
function of proportion of positive 
reinforcements. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1, 659-663. doi:10.1037/h0022073 
Clore, G. L,, & Gormly, J. B. (1974). Knowing, feeling, and 
liking: A psychophysiological study of attraction. Journal 
of Research in Personality, 8, 218-230. doi:10.1016/0092-
6566(74)90033-6 
Crano, W. D., & Prislin, R. (2006). Attitudes and 
persuasion. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 345-374. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190034 
De Waal, F. B. (2008). Putting the altruism back into 
altruism: The evolution of empathy. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 59, 279-300. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093625 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Scherer, K. R. (2003). Appraisal 
processes in emotion. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, 
& H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective 
sciences (pp. 572-595). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Smith, C. A. (1988a). From appraisal to 
emotion: Differences among unpleasant 
feelings. Motivation and Emotion, 2, 271-302. 
doi:10.1007/BF00993115 
Ellsworth, P. C., & Smith, C. A. (1988b). Shades of joy: 
Patterns of appraisal differentiating pleasant 
emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 2, 301-331. 
doi:10.1080/02699938808412702 
Evers, C., Fischer, A. H., Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., & 
Manstead, A. S. (2005). Anger and social appraisal: A 
"spicy" sex difference?. Emotion, 5, 258-
266. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.5.3.258 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison 
processes. Human Relations, 7, 117-
140. doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 
Fischer, A. H., & Evers, C. (2011). The social costs and 
benefits of anger as a function of gender and relationship 
context. Sex roles, 65, 23-34. doi:10.1007/s11199-011-
9956-x 
Frijda, N.H. (1986). The Emotions. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hall, J. A., & Schmid Mast, M. (2007). Sources of accuracy 
in the empathic accuracy paradigm. Emotion, 7, 438-
446. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.438 
Hareli, S., & Parkinson, B. (2008). What's social about 
social emotions?. Journal for the Theory of Social 
APPRAISAL SIMILARITY AND LIKING | NG, TONGM & KWEK 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 86 
Behaviour, 38, 131-156. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5914.2008.00363.x 
Jakobs, E., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (1999). 
Social motives, emotional feelings, and 
smiling. Cognition and Emotion, 13, 321-
345. doi:10.1080/026999399379212 
Jakobs, E., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2001). 
Social context effects on facial activity in a negative 
emotional setting. Emotion, 1, 51-69. doi:10.1037/1528-
3542.1.1.51 
Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Oatley, K. (1992). Basic emotions, 
rationality, and folk theory. Cognition and Emotion, 
6, 201-223. doi:10.1080/02699939208411069 
Kahneman, D., Krueger, A. B., Schkade, D. A., Schwarz, 
N., & Stone, A. A. (2004). A survey method for 
characterizing daily life experience: The day 
reconstruction method. Science, 306, 1776-1780. 
doi:10.1126/science.1103572 
Klohnen, E. C., & Luo, S. (2003). Interpersonal attraction 
and personality: What is attractive - self similarity, ideal 
similarity, complementarity or attachment 
security?. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
85, 709-722. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.709 
Krosnick, J. A., & Petty, R. E. (1995). Attitude strength: An 
overview. In R. E. Petty and J. A. Krosnick 
(Eds.), Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 
247-282). Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). 
Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive actions in an 
intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79, 602-616. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.79.4.602 
Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2001). Social 
appraisal: The social world as object of and influence on 
appraisal processes. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. 
Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, 
methods, research (pp. 221-232). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Muller, D., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2005). When 
moderation is mediated and mediation is moderated. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 852-863. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.852  
Nesse, R. M., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2009). Evolution, 
emotions, and emotional disorders. American 
Psychologist, 64, 129-139. doi:10.1037/a0013503 
Neumann, R. (2000). The causal influences of attributions 
on emotions: A procedural priming 
approach. Psychological Science, 11, 179-182. 
doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00238 
Oatley, K., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1987). Towards a 
cognitive theory of the emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 
1, 29-50. doi:10.1080/02699938708408362  
Piaget, J. (1932). The moral judgment of the child. London: 
Kegan Paul.  
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS 
procedures for estimating indirect effects in simple 
mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 
Instruments, & Computers, 36, 717-731. 
doi:10.3758/BF03206553  
Reis, H. T., Maniaci, M. R., Caprariello, P. A., Eastwick, 
P. W., & Finkel, E. J. (2011). Familarity does indeed 
promote attraction in live interaction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 557-570. 
doi:10.1037/a0022885 
Reisenzein, R., & Hofmann, T. (1993). Discriminating 
emotions from appraisal-relevant situational 
information: Baseline data for structural models of 
cognitive appraisals. Cognition & Emotion, 7, 271-293. 
doi:10.1080/02699939308409190 
Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A., & Jose, P. E. (1996). 
Appraisal determinants of emotions: Constructing a 
more accurate and comprehensive theory. Cognition & 
Emotion, 10, 241-278. doi:10.1080/026999396380240 
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, 
negativity dominance, and contagion. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 5, 296-320. 
doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504_2 
Schachter, S. (1959). The psychology of affiliation: 
Experimental studies of the source of 
gregariousness. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press. 
Scherer, K. R. (1997). Profiles of emotion-antecedent 
appraisal: testing theoretical predictions across 
cultures. Cognition & Emotion, 11, 113-150. 
doi:10.1080/026999397379962 
Scherer, K. R., Banse, R., & Wallbott, H. G. 
(2001). Emotion inferences from vocal expression 
correlate across languages and cultures. Journal of Cross-
cultural Psychology, 32, 76-92. 
doi:10.1177/0022022101032001009 
Shah, J. (2003). The motivational looking glass: How 
significant others implicitly affect goal appraisals. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 424-439. 
doi:10.1037/002 2-3514.85.3.424 
Singh, R., & Ho, S. Y. (2000). Attitudes and attraction: A 
new test of the attraction, repulsion and similarity-
dissimilarity asymmetry hypotheses. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 39, 197-211. 
doi:10.1348/014466600164426  
Singh, R., & Teoh, J. B. P. (1999). Attitudes and attraction: 
A test of two hypotheses for the similarity-dissimilarity 
asymmetry. British Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 427-
443. doi:10.1348/014466699164257  
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of 
cognitive appraisals in emotions. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.48.4.813 
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1987). Patterns of 
appraisal and emotion related to taking an exam. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 475-488. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.3.475 
Tong, E. M. W. (2010). Personality influences in appraisal-
emotion relationships: The role of Neuroticism. Journal 
of Personality, 78, 393-417. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6494.2010.00620.x 
 
APPRAISAL SIMILARITY AND LIKING | NG, TONGM & KWEK 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 87 
 
Appendix 
 
Figure 1: 
IJS scores as a function of appraisal similarity and attitude similarity (Experiment 2) 
 
 
Figure 2: 
IJS scores as a function of appraisal similarity and attitude similarity (Experiment 3) 
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Figure 3: 
Mediation analysis examining perceived validation as mediator of the effect of appraisal similarity on 
interpersonal liking (Experiment 3) 
 
 
Table 1: 
Mediated moderation analysis examining perceived validation as mediator of the interaction effect between 
appraisal similarity and attitude similarity on interpersonal liking (Experiment 3) 
 IV Moderator IV × Moderator Mediator Moderator × 
Mediator 
Model 1 .20* (.10) .38***(.10) .27** (.10)   
Model 2  .39*** (.09) .25** (.09) .29** (.09)   
Model 3  .10 (.10) 1.20** (.41) .24* (.10) .42*** (.10) -.23* (.10) 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. In parentheses are standard errors. In Models 1 and 2, the 
dependent variable (DV; interpersonal liking) and mediator (perceived validation), respectively, were 
regressed onto the independent variable (IV; appraisal similarity), the moderator (attitude similarity), and 
the interaction term. In Model 3, the DV was regressed onto the IV, the moderator, the mediator, and 
two interaction terms involving the moderator.  
  
 
 
 Appraisal similarity 
Perceived validation 
Interpersonal liking 
0.39** (0.09) 
-0.01 (0.10)  
0.54** (0.10) 
Note: * p < .05, **p < .001 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  Appraisal similarity Interpersonal liking 
0.20* (0.10) 
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 Vignette in Experiment 1 
Something awful has happened. A few days ago, my friends and I were having lunch at the canteen before 
our lessons. Gary played a joke on me by pulling my seat from under me while I was about to sit down. I 
fell and injured my hands. As a result, I could not take the driving test that was scheduled the next day. 
Even though Gary had apologized to me, I felt that he was not sincere. Today, I did the same thing to 
him. I did not exactly mean to hurt him; at that time, I did it on impulse and I was thinking that it would 
be funny. However, he hurt his back when he fell down. What is worse is that he has a basketball 
competition tomorrow. It seems that his back injury is quite serious and he is very unlikely to play 
tomorrow. 
  
Vignette in Experiments 2 and 3 
I was a member of NUSSU (National University of Singapore Student Union) and was helping the External 
Affair Director Raymond organize a talk on public finance by a government minister. The talk was to be 
held in a conference hall in a major hotel on Stamford Road on a Saturday evening. This talk is an important 
item on NUSSU’s calendar and we had invited not just current undergraduates, but also NUS alumni and 
well-known members of the finance world. 
  
Response for the talk was overwhelming and full attendance was expected. The talk was scheduled to start 
on 7pm that Saturday, but Raymond, knowing that people could come in late for various reasons, indicated 
on the invitation email and also on the acknowledgement and reminder emails to attendees to be seated by 
6.45pm. On that day, while most of the attendees arrived on time, a substantial number (we estimated to 
be about 15%) came in late after 7pm. These late-comers walked in after the Minister started his speech, 
which was quite distracting. 
The reasons they were late could possibly be due to the rain, which typically would slow traffic down, and 
probably also the fact that it was a weekend evening on a popular downtown location. Although the 
Minister told us later that he did not mind and that he in fact appreciated our effort in organizing the talk, 
I thought that things could have been done better. 
  
